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Payments are a compensation for a product or a service received. The funds are
transferred from one party (consumer) to another (merchant). Mobile payments
are a particular form of electronic payment where a mobile device serves as the
key instrument to initiate, authorize or complete a payment. The payment meth-
ods have been continuously changing to adjust to cashless trends. Seeking to
reach a larger number of customers has promoted the development of different
solutions to provide means of payment. With an increasing number of mobile
subscribers, mobile solutions such as carrier billing, SMS-based payments, and
mobile wallets are gaining importance, permeating different markets, such as
public transportation, digital content, advertisements and charity.
This thesis investigates and analyses mobile payment solutions. The main pur-
pose is, primarily, to identify and describe the security protocols that occur during
the payment transaction. Subsequently, to distinguish the mechanisms utilised
to identify and authenticate consumers and the mechanisms providing integrity
to the payment data. Additionally, to recognize the possible security threats
overlooked during the design and deployment of payment solutions.
The analysis and tests carried out showed opportunity areas for the service
providers to improve the security level of their services. We found vulnerabilities
that jeopardise the integrity and authenticity of transactions from the merchant
and consumer sides. The major vulnerabilities found lead to conclude that de-
spite the development of protocols and technologies to strengthen security, an
appropriate analysis is required to design and develop secure solutions. Neglect-
ing security requirements in exchange for simplicity could come at a high price
for the parties involved in mobile payments, specially, in direct carrier billing.
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API Application Programming Interface
CDMA Code-Division Multiple access
CSS Cascading Style Sheets
GSM Global System for Mobile Communications
HMAC keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
HTML HyperText Markup Language
HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
HTTPS Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure
J2ME Java 2 Micro Edition
MNO Mobile Network Operator
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NFC Near Field Communication
OS Operating System
OTP One-Time password
PC Personal Computer
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SANS System Administration, Networking, and Security
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SMS Short Message Services
SMSC Short Message Services Center
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
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USSD Unstructured Supplementary Service Data
VAT Value Added Tax
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network
XML Extensible Markup Language
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The beginning of mobile payments dates from back to 1997 when, in Finland,
the telecom operator Sonera allowed consumers to buy sodas from vending
machines using mobile phones and paying for them through the operator’s bill
[21]. Ever since, a variety of solutions have been developed to keep pace with
digitalization and new use cases. The technologies include, gateway-based
payment services, messaging-based services, stored-value-based services and
mobile identification and authorization based payment services [7].
As the number of mobile subscriptions continues to grow in most coun-
tries [2], special attention has been dedicated to the development of mobile
payment solutions. In the process of developing mobile payment solutions,
service providers realised about the limitation to penetrate in larger markets
by focusing on direct debit and credit card payments only. The limitation
is the result of a global market where mobile phone users outnumber bank
account holders. Thus, payment service providers worked together with mo-
bile operators to enable direct carrier billing for their customers. In different
parts of the world the direct carrier billing payment method has had wide
acceptance and continues to grow [8]. In the Scandinavia region where mo-
bile subscriptions already surpass 1.7 per capita [30], applications for public
transportation tickets, electronic banking, contest voting, peer-to-peer trans-
fers, and purchases of goods and services from online shops are already highly
popular. These applications use mobile payment solutions that offer direct
debit, credit card, SMS, and carrier billing payment methods.
Problem Statement
Some of the payment solutions available for online purchases require a single
click from the consumer to execute the payment, which, from the usability
9
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 10
point of view, is a rather simple process. However, simple payment solutions
have brought problems to consumers in the past. Dimoco, a global service
provider for direct carrier billing, received several complaints in 2015 for
serving as an interface for fraudulent merchants to make unauthorised charges
to subscribers of several mobile operators [6][22]. Therefore, it is necessary
to investigate and analyse mobile payments from an IT security point of
view and determine if they truly offer the security required by such sensitive
transactions between consumers and merchants. Thus, the specific goals of
this thesis are:
1. Investigate and understand the different mobile payment technologies
and solutions currently available.
2. Find specific mobile payment service providers and merchants to anal-
yse the security protocols used for the mobile payments.
3. Identify threats and potential design weaknesses and, if found, define
attack scenarios to demonstrate the vulnerabilities.
4. Report the findings and identify security requirements that need to be
strengthened by the implementations studied.
Structure of the thesis
The remainder of the thesis is organized in chapters. Chapter 2 sets the
foundation to understand mobile payments, it presents the different tech-
nologies, methods and security requirements for mobile payment services.
Additionally, Chapter 2 describes the protocol followed for the completion of
payment transactions in some well-known global payment solutions. Chapter
3 presents the security analysis made to two different Finnish payment ser-
vice providers accepting direct carrier billing as a mobile payment method.
The security analysis of Chapter 3 is divided into sections to describe the
characteristics, adversary model and threats of the services studied. Chap-
ter 4 evaluates the services under study and lists the security requirements
met by the service providers. A discussion about the results of the security
analysis is made in Chapter 5. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis.
Chapter 2
Background
This chapter establishes the foundations to understand the main topic of this
thesis, mobile payments. The chapter starts by defining mobile payments
and the entities involved in the execution of payments. It then presents the
technologies and methods available to carry out such payments.
Mobile Payments
A payment is a financial transaction where a compensation is deposited for
a product (digital/physical) or a service received. In the execution of a
payment, funds are transferred from one entity to another.
Mobile payments (M-payments) are a special form of payment where a
mobile device such as a mobile phone, smartphone or any wireless device
´serves to complete, securely, at least one phase of the financial transaction
over a mobile network or other wireless technology [9].
Several technologies and protocols have enabled the development of mo-
bile payments [23]. In the following sections, different mobile payment tech-
nologies and solutions are presented.
Entities
To complete a payment, different entities participate in the process (Fig. 2.1).
In the simplest model of mobile payment, a minimum of four parties are re-
quired:
• Merchant (payee): The one selling or offering products and services,
the merchant is the entity whose account is credited.
11
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Fig. 2.1: Entities participating in the execution of a payment.
• Consumer (payer): The one benefiting from the from goods or ser-
vices of the merchants, the consumer is the entity whose account is
debited.
• Bank of the merchant: The institution providing a merchant ac-
count capable of receiving funds. Typically, the institution is a com-
mercial bank. However, other institutions offer merchant accounts and
financial transaction processing services.
• Bank of the consumer: The institution providing consumers with
credit or debit accounts. Typically, the institution is a commercial
bank. However, other credit providers can play the role.
Alternative models add entities to the payment process. Instead of making
the financial transactions directly, some intermediaries can take part in the
process:
• Payment processor: Authorized entity coordinating and processing
transactions among financial institutions. The processor, in conjunc-
tion with the banks of the payer and payee, form the payment network.
• Gateway: Serves as the connection between the merchant and con-
sumer and the payment network.
The figures of the processor and the gateway are not mandatory to complete
payments and can be present as a single entity.
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Communication Technologies for M-Payments
Short Message Services(SMS)
The SMS is a protocol that allows messages of up to 160 characters to be
exchanged between mobile phones and a SMS centre (SMSC) using the GSM
communications network. The mobile device connects to the base station of
the mobile network provider to access the GSM network, in the network, the
message is forwarded to the SMSC. From the service centre, the information
in the message is forwarded to the merchant and/or payment processor (Fig.
2.2). Payments based on SMS use mobile terminated (sent to mobile phone)
or mobile originated (sent from mobile phone) messages. The merchant must
request a mobile operator for a phone number or short code 1 capable to
receive and/or send messages. The merchant can choose to use the number
to receive payments, in which case the operator will bill a premium fee to
the consumer for sending messages to that number and credit the merchant
for an amount previously agreed. From the SMSC or SMS gateway, the
operator sends the information regarding the content of the message (i.e.,
order details) to the merchant server. Then, the merchant processes the
order. Additionally, the merchant can choose to only receive information
about the content of the message which can be the consumer bank account
and order details. The SMSC sends the information to the merchant server
and the merchant processed the order and payment.
Even though SMS uses a channel different from voice to access to the
phone, it is vulnerable to different attacks, i.e., spoofing, message filtering
and spam, especially on the operator side because it is a store-and-forward
technology [12].
Unstructured Supplementary Services Delivery (USSD)
The USSD is a capability of the GSM standard to support the transmis-
sion of information over the GSM signaling network. USSD offers session-
based communication, enabling a variety of applications including mobile
payments. USSD is session and transaction-oriented technology; response
times for interactive applications are shorter for USSD than SMS. The con-
sumers indicate their intention to make a purchase to the merchant by send-
ing an USSD request in the form of a command using their mobile device.
1Short code: 4-digit code map to a mobile number. Typically, the code is constant
among mobile operators in one region
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Fig. 2.2: Architecture of SMS-based mobile payment.
The commands are standardized; in a typical scenario of micropayment 2,
the command has the following form:
[USSD code] * [phone number] * [transaction type] * [product ID] *
[amount]
The mobile device connects to the base station of the network provider to
access the GSM network. Once in the network, the command is forwarded
to the USSD gateway. The USSD gateway communicates using the SS7
protocol. After receiving the requests, it creates a session and routes the
information to the merchant server or payment system (Fig. 2.3). The
response is received in XML form to finally confirm the transaction to the
consumer in an USSD message. As in SMS-based payments, the mobile
operator is tightly integrated to the payment process and provides services
such as authentication and billing.
There are other forms of services [14] that use the USSD for person to
person payments, mobile advertising and voting.
Mobile Broadband
Packet data over mobile networks enabled Internet communication services
such as email and web browsing. Since the introduction of the GPRS (Gen-
eral Packet Radio Services), Internet packets can be transmitted to and
from mobile devices using mobile networks. As wireless access technologies
evolved, the transmission of data, voice and video acquired higher trans-
mission rates, broadening the range of applicability of mobile devices to in-
clude mobile payments transactions over the internet, which considerably
2Micropayment: Financial transaction made online involving a very small amount of
money.
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 15
Fig. 2.3: Architecture of USSD-based mobile payment.
increased with the introduction of the 3G and 4G generation technologies
such as UMTS and LTE, respectively.
To make a payment, the consumer sends the request through the LTE
network. The request is routed to the merchant server. The transaction
is completed by the payment gateway involving the banks of both parties,
the consumer and the merchant. As will be shown in this thesis, there are
major challenges in integrating operator-based authentication and billing to
payment services over. This is because the operator is essentially acting as
an Internet Service Provider (ISP) and it is not supposed to interfere with
the transmitted data.
Fig. 2.4: Architecture of mobile broadband-based mobile payment.
Wireless Local Area Network(WLAN)
An alternative to mobile broadband for data communications in mobile de-
vices are WLANs.
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The Wireless Ethernet Standard family 802.11x establishes the specifi-
cations to implement WLANs. The typical and widely used technology for
WLAN is known as Wi-Fi which is based on the 802.11x family and has
evolved to offer greater data transmission rates. Mobile devices that support
WLAN connectivity can access the internet to execute payment transactions
with the merchants and bank servers. Due to the distributed management of
WLANs, the network in this case cannot provide any special security features
to support the payment process.
Fig. 2.5: Architecture of WLAN-based mobile payment.
Near Field Communication (NFC)
NFC is a short-range (few centimetres) wireless technology resulting from
the combination of Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) tags and a mobile
phone. NFC allows three different modes of operation:
• Reader/Writer. The NFC enabled phones can read NFC tags in this
mode.
• Card emulator. The mobile phone is used as a contactless card with
no additional adaptors in the payment structure.
• Peer-to-peer (P2P). In this mode two NFC enabled devices can ex-
change data. NFC technology enables innovative applications such as
ticketing systems and micro-payment systems [19].
To provide security, NFC possess a ”Secure Element” (SE) that consist of
a special location in the memory where trusted applications can store and
retrieve sensitive information
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Fig. 2.6: Architecture of NFC Mobile Payment.
Software Platforms
In addition to the technologies available to transmit payment data and to
process payments, the service providers leverage the software development
technologies to develop clients for the payment systems in the following man-
ners.
Mobile Applications
The client for a mobile payment system can reside on the mobile device of
the consumer as an application. Depending on the architecture and design
of the application it may be classified as phone-based and SIM-based.
Phone-based Application
The operating system of the mobile device determines the appropriate soft-
ware stack to develop a native mobile application. The Android operating
system requires the application to be developed in Java(J2ME) for GSM
mobile phones or in Binary Runtime Environment for Wireless (BREW) for
CDMA mobile phones. The operating system by Apple, iOS, requires the
application to be developed in Objective-C.
SIM-based Application
The subscriber identity module (SIM) used in mobile phones, is a smart card
with storage and processing capabilities. Typically, the SIM card is used to
identify and authenticate the mobile device to the mobile operator network,
however, the SIM Application Toolkit facilitates the mechanisms to develop
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SIM-based applications. These applications can store sensitive information
in the SIM card, the information in the card can be protected from access
using cryptographic algorithms. Thus, SIM-based applications offer slightly
better security than mobile application.
Mobile Wallet
A mobile wallet is a type of electronic wallet that resides in the mobile
device as an application containing details about the consumer, such as,
bank account and credit or debit card information, thus, allowing payments
using a mobile device. Several proprietary implementations of wallets are
used globally, e.g., Google Wallet and Apple Pay.
Web-based Applications
Merchants can avoid the endeavour of developing a mobile application and
take advantage of the internet browsers available for mobile devices. Then,
it is required to create a web application to serve as the client for the mobile
payment system. Typically, a mobile client comprises JavaScript code, a
style sheet (CSS), a HTML document and a presentation framework.
Mobile Payments Methods
Several payment solutions exist today. They can be classified by the tech-
nology they implement or by the type of payment they can execute. Usually,
one solution results from the combination of different technologies and one
or more methods of payment. The different payment methods can be clas-
sified per their connectivity [4] or per the type of payment realized. For the
purposes of this thesis, the latter classification is listed below:
1. Direct billing: Banks, MNO and/or phone manufactures join to pro-
vide direct billing. The bank account and the phone number and mobile
device of the consumer are linked. When a payment is executed, the
bank account of the consumer is debited and the amount is credited to
the account of the merchant.
2. Credit card: For this method, the credit card number is linked to
the phone number (or mobile device) of the consumer. When the con-
sumer makes a payment transaction with a merchant, the credit card
is charged and the amount is credited to the account of the merchant.
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3. Direct Carrier billing: Consumers agree to make payments to mer-
chants for services or products using their mobile phone; the transaction
is then charged in the mobile phone bill. The mobile operator identifies
the user by the SIM card, allowing with this, the execution of payments
without additional registration or signing in, resulting in the so called
one-click payments [13]. This thesis focuses on this payment method,
although we also investigate about the other payment methods.
Security Requirements
Independent of the technology and payment method adopted by a mobile
payment solution, the technical security it provides and to what extent it is
perceived as a secure solution becomes a significant aspect to determine its
adoption and success, as several surveys show [7][28][20].
Due to the sensitivity of the transactions carried out by mobile payment
solutions, these solutions should meet the following minimum security re-
quirements [24][16], to effect secure mobile payments:
• Identification. The mobile payment solution should be able to iden-
tify the entities and subjects involved in the payment process. To
achieve this requirement each entity should have a unique identifier. In
a mobile payment system, the mobile phone number (MSISDN), a user
ID or a bank account number qualify as identifiers.
• Authentication. Proof of identity is equally as important as identifi-
cation; hence, the system should have the appropriate means to ensure
an entity is who it claims to be. Three factors allow the system to verify
the identity of an entity: Something it has (e.g., a token, a smart card,
a certificate), something it knows (e.g., a password, a personal iden-
tification number (PIN)), or something it is (e.g., a fingerprint, voice,
retina pattern).
• Authorisation. Limit and establish the minimum level of privileges
each party owns to successfully execute transactions and control the
access to the information flowing in the payment process.
• Integrity. End-to-end data integrity is required to guarantee messages
exchanged between the trading parties in an open network contain the
correct information about the transaction, this includes avoiding unau-
thorised data modifications as data traverses the network or while it is
stored.
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• Confidentiality. Information regarding the trading parties should
remain private to the payment system to avoid its misuse. This is
achieved with encryption. Several crypto algorithms are available to
provide strong encryption.
• Audit mechanisms and non-repudiation. For audit purposes,
logs of the transactions executed are required. The information these
records contain may include a unique identifier, timestamps, the traders
involved and the value of the transaction. By retaining audit trails, the
traders should not be able to repudiate their participation in the trans-
action.
Meeting the requirements above mentioned has no trivial solution. In a mo-
bile or wireless environment, constraints exist related to the computational
capabilities of the mobile devices, power consumption and a large number
of security threats inherent of the open-air transmission in wireless networks
and roaming in untrusted access points. Furthermore, wireless networks are
constrained by less bandwidth, greater latency and lower connection stability
than wired networks. In an effort to protect consumers governmental and pri-
vate organization have created regulation and standards for financial transac-
tions, adding requirements for mobile payment solutions providers who must
comply with global regulation such as the PCI Data Security Standard (PCI
DSS) 3 and country-specific or local regulatory, such as MAPEL4 in the case
of Finland.
Global Payment Solutions
Different payment service providers exist today to facilitate platforms that
enable electronic and mobile payments. These payment service providers
emphasize the security of their services. Each provider has developed its
own protocol to carry out mobile payments.
In this section, the protocol of three of the widely analysed and adopted
[5][26] payment service providers are described.
3 Security Standards Council for the PCI (Payment Card Industry), a global forum
for the ongoing development, enhancement, storage, dissemination and implementation of
security standards for account data protection.
4MAPEL (MAksullisten Puhelinpalveluiden Eettinen Lautakunta), Finnish self-
regulatory for Toll Services
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Stripe
Stripe is a payment processor that offers a complete toolkit for merchants
to collect payments in a secure fashion. Stripe provides an REST API and
extensive documentation for developers to integrate Stripe products into their
web or mobile applications. The list of Stripe products comprises, among
others, Checkout, Connect, Radar and Atlas 5.
The standard payment process using Stripe requires the merchant to in-
tegrate the Stripe Checkout form into its web or mobile application to collect
data about the consumer and the payment. Payment data is sent directly
to Stripe servers where it is verified. If the data is valid, Stripe will create
a token to represent the payment data and send it to the merchant server,
then, the merchant server can create a charge (transaction) to request for
a payment using the token received by Stripe. The request is processed by
Stripe who, in turn, requests the payment to the consumer credit provider
(i.e. consumer bank). Finally, Stripe returns the status of the transaction
(i.e., failed, successful, pending) back to the merchant server who can con-
firm the transaction to the consumer. The payment process flow is shown in
figure 2.7.
Fig. 2.7: Executing a payment with Stripe.
Stripe succeeds at providing security services such as:
5Stripe official products https://stripe.com
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 22
• Authentication: Stripe API and payment services are available only
to registered merchants who receive a pair or keys during their regis-
tration: Publishable Key for identification and a Secret Key for trans-
actions.
• Authorization: Stripe accepts requests from servers with a valid pub-
lishable API key. Charge requests are processed only if a valid merchant
sends a valid secret key as part of the request.
• Confidentiality: Data sent to and from Stripe servers traverses the
internet encrypted using secure HTTPS connections. Sensitive infor-
mation provided by the consumer is shared only once to Stripe, by using
data tokenization. Any sensitive information is protected from being
sent back and forth in the messages required to complete payments.
• Compliance: By integrating the checkout form, merchants ensure
they will comply with regulatory such as PCI because they are not han-
dling financial information directly, instead, they transfer the respon-
sibility to Stripe, additionally the logs of each transaction are stored
for audit purposes. Integrity: Stripe procures the integrity of the infor-
mation by using tokenization and secure channels to transmit payment
information preventing unauthorized changes during transmission.
PayPal
Another payment company whose main payment processing products in-
clude: Express Checkout, an extension for the merchant web application to
enable PayPal as a payment method; Payments Standard, a checkout page
to carry out the complete payment process; Payments Pro, a customizable
solution to process payments by using the payment gateway PayFlow Gate-
way and PayPal Here, a solution that facilitates in-store payments using a
mobile device with NFC technology 6.
The common transaction flow to complete a payment using PayPal Pay-
ments Pro and PayFlow gateway is depicted in figure 2.8.
6PayPal available products for merchants https://www.paypal.com/fi/webapps/mpp/merchant
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 23
Fig. 2.8: Executing a payment with PayPal.
The consumer clicks buy on the merchant web page, the merchant server
requests a secure token (up to 32 characters) to the gateway by passing a
token ID (36 characters). The gateway returns to the merchant server the
secure token created and the token ID. With both tokens the merchant server
makes an HTTP post to the checkout page (hosted in the gateway) and redi-
rects the client browser to the checkout page. The gateway retrieves the
transaction details from the secure token and request card or account cre-
dentials to the consumer. The gateway processes the payments and returns
the client browser to the merchant page and sends the status of the payment
to the merchant. To secure the payment process, PayPal enforces:
• Authentication: PayPal provides to its registered merchants a unique
token ID to post HTTP requests to the gateway and a user and pass-
word to access the gateway API.
• Authorization: PayPal limits the transaction capabilities per the
type of account held by the merchants.
• Confidentiality: Data sent to and from PayPal gateway traverses the
internet encrypted using secure HTTPS connections.
• Integrity: PayPal protects transaction data such as amount, type and
currency by using tokens to present that information to the consumers.
• Compliance: By integrating the checkout pages hosted by PayPal,
merchants ensure they will comply with regulatory requirements such
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as PCI, similarly to Stripe, PayPal acquires the responsibility by han-
dling sensitive data themselves and preventing merchants from collect-
ing such data. Additionally, PayPal stores logs of each transaction for
audit purposes.
Apple Pay
A mobile wallet available in Apple products 7, the wallet is loaded with credit
and debit cards and then used for in-store and in-app purchases. For in-store
purchases the NFC technology is employed. Therefore, stores accepting this
payment method need a contactless point-of-sales.
To activate the wallet, the user must enter the card information which is
immediately ciphered and sent to the Apple servers. In the servers, Apple
deciphers the data to determine the payment network. Then, data is ciphered
again and sent to the corresponding payment network with a key that only
the authorized networks know. Apple sends additional data directly to the
issuer bank including the iTunes account 8 activity and the device details
such as phone number, model, location and time it is motion. The bank
returns to Apple a Device-specific Account Number in addition to a key used
to generate unique security codes per transaction. Finally, Apple adds the
received data to the Secure Element (i.e., a certified chip) of the device that
stores information isolated from the operating system.
After the wallet is activated, to execute a payment from a merchant web
page or mobile application using Apple Pay, it is required for the merchant
to own a Payment Processing certificate which contains a key to encrypt
and decrypt data. The application sends a payment request along with the
payment details to Apple Pay. Apple Play receives the request and asks
the consumer for authorization. After receiving the authorization, on the
device, Apple Pay sends the payment requests to the Secure Element where
payment data, specified card and merchant ID are tokenized altogether. The
token created is sent from the Secure Element to Apple Pay to be forwarded
to an Apple server. In the server, Apple encrypts the token using the key
in the Payment Processing certificate and signs it. To conclude with the
process, the encrypted and signed token is sent back to the device where
the application can decipher the token and send it directly to the payment
network or a payment gateway. The entire process when paying with Apple
Pay is shown in figure 2.9.
7List of devices that support Apple Pay https://support.apple.com/it-it/KM207105
8 iTunes account: User account held in the Apple’s iTunes Store
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Fig. 2.9: Executing a payment with Apple Pay.
Apple Pay managed to provide security services including:
• Authentication: Apple Pay identifies and authenticates each mer-
chant with a proprietary Payment Processing Certificate; for its users,
an iTunes Account serves as the identification while the authentication
is provisioned with a passcode or using Touch ID (Apple proprietary
fingerprint sensing system [15]). After authorization is received, the
payment information is encrypted, when is outside the secure element
• Authorization: Each transaction completed with Apple Pay requires
the consumer to validate and authorize it with Touch ID or a passcode.
• Confidentiality: The Information transmitted between the different
parties involved in the process of registration and payment is ciphered
before being sent. Apple Pay compels merchants to have servers sup-
porting TLS and serving content over HTTPS. Tokenization is used to
avoid the necessity of storing sensitive data in the mobile devices or
Apple server.
• Integrity: In addition to the secure channels employed to transmit
data, which protects it from being tampered as it traverses the in-
ternet, Apple Pay utilizes a built-in secure element to store sensitive
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information. The access to such information is protected using elliptic
curve cryptography to prevent unauthorized access or modifications.
When data leaves the secure element, it is already tokenized.
Chapter 3
Security Analysis
This chapter describes the security analysis of two mobile payment solutions
offering direct carrier billing as payment method.
Case studies
We conducted an investigation to define the subjects of study and decide
the scope of the security analysis presented in this thesis. We found that,
in Finland, a relatively new brand for mobile payments named Mobiilimaksu
has been adopted to allow consumers to pay for services through direct car-
rier billing. The payment method is accepted across merchants of different
sectors, including charity, advertisement, public transportation and media
content. Mobiilimaksu is currently available for clients of the major Finnish
mobile operators 1 including Sonera2, Elisa3 and DNA4. Mobiilimaksu was
introduced as a “self-execution payment transaction that does not require
separate registration or sign-up” 5. The simplicity of Mobiilimaksu to enable
direct carrier billing, in conjunction with the growth of this mobile payment
method in the world, make it an interesting subject of study for this thesis.
To obtain conclusive results, two merchants accepting the Mobiilimaksu
payment method were selected to be the case studies to analyse this mo-
bile payment method. The following criteria was considered to select the
merchants for the case studies:
1Market shares of mobile subscriptions, Report by the Finnish Communications Regu-
latory Authority: www.viestintavirasto.fi/en/statisticsandreports/statistics/2013/market
sharesofmobilesubscriptions.html
2Sonera webpage: www.telia.fi
3Elisa webpage: elisa.fi
4DNA webpage: www.dna.fi
5Mobiilimaksu web page: www.mobiilimaksuinfo.fi
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• Offer services for small prices.
• The services remain intangible (i.e., no physical product is received as
part of the service)
• No harm caused to additional parties.
• Purchases are easily reproducible.
• Analysing the payment transaction do not require special equipment.
The merchants chosen were Tori, a web-based marketplace offering adver-
tising services, and PayiQ Tickets, a mobile application to acquire tickets
for public transportation, both accept the Mobiilimkasu payment method to
pay for their services. The remainder of the chapter will present the security
analysis of the two case studies chosen. The SANS institute proposes threat
modelling as a process to ensure application security during the design of
any given application. Testing the security of the application is part of the
threat modelling as vulnerabilities and threats are identified [3]. The sub-
jects of study chosen are already deployed and commercially available. Thus,
the process cannot be applied as described. However, the fundamentals of
the threat modelling will serve as guidance to perform the security analysis.
Characterizing the Systems
As an external entity to the development and deployment teams of the sys-
tems in study, the first step was to characterize the systems by searching
for available information and acting as a legitimate user. Because of the
little (publicly available) documentation about the systems studied, it was
necessary to apply reverse engineering to gather sufficient information to
characterize the systems. This activity is not necessary for a person who has
full access to the technical specifications as developers do and it poses the
risk of having an incomplete characterization of the systems. Nonetheless,
the reverse engineering work made in this thesis lead to definite results for
the security analysis.
The characterization of each system comprises a brief description of the
system, the services it offers, the process to acquire a service or electronic
product, and a detailed description of the protocol observed at the time of
the payment transaction.
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Tori market place with Securycast payments
Tori.fi is a Finnish online service that allows people to advertise goods. To
publish a product, the users create an advertisement containing the details of
the product on sale. Tori offers upgrades to promote an advertisement. Those
upgrades can be bought for one day, one week or another available scheme.
When users want to upgrade an advertisement, they have the possibility to
pay by direct carrier billing if connected through to a MNO network.
To obtain detailed information about the process implemented by Tori to
provide its services and to offer Mobiilimaksu as a payment method, several
tests were carried out using a Lenovo notebook with Linux O.S. and Firefox
browser. A Nexus 9 tablet connected to the network of Finnish MNO Elisa
served as the Access Point.
Process
This section describes the process to request, pay and receive an upgrade
from Tori and the protocol observed within the process.
User selects the upgrade desired for a specific advertisement (Fig. 3.1),
then proceeds to checkout to select the payment method (Fig. 3.2).
Fig. 3.1: Upgrades available. Fig. 3.2: Webcart form.
After accepting the terms and conditions, the user clicks on “Vahvista
Maksu” (Confirm Payment in Finnish). If the user has sufficient funds in the
mobile account (limited to 150e per month), the payment is accepted and a
confirmation including a link to download the receipt is received (Fig. 3.3).
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Additionally, the user receives a confirmation email, later, the advertisement
is upgraded accordingly (Fig. 3.4).
Fig. 3.3: Confirmation of payment. Fig. 3.4: Confirmation mail.
Protocol
To investigate further about the parties involved in the process, the traffic
between the client and the web server was analysed using Wireshark. After
the analysis, it was observed that most traffic is carried out through TLS.
Little plaintext HTTP traffic was captured, leaving the analysis inconclusive.
Therefore, a type of Man in the Middle technique 6 had to be used at this
point of the analysis.
The Protocol described below is the result of the analysis of all the TLS
traffic captured with the SSL proxy between the browser and the Tori web
page at the time of the payment transaction. Figure 3.5 depicts the different
parties involved and the steps carried out to complete the payment process.
6TLS Proxy: A technique where a proxy is configured in the browser to ciphered and
deciphered the TLS traffic between the browser and the web servers, acting as a Man in
the Middle.
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Fig. 3.5: Steps of the payment process.
Parties Involved
Below is the list of parties observed during the payment process.
• Client: The web browser used by any user to access services from Tori.
• Tori: Web-based marketplace.
• Securycast: Mobile Payment Service Provider. Handles payments
between the merchant and the mobile network operator.
• Elisa: Mobile Network Operator, providing the client with internet
connection and the Mobiilimaksu payment method.
Transaction Flow The steps to request and pay for a service at Tori page
are listed below, starting from the moment the consumer has posted an ad
and is offered to upgrade it, to the moment he receives a confirmation of the
payment.
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1. The consumer, connected to Tori page via his mobile network, clicks
to see the available upgrades for his ad. The browser sends the request
to Tori server, passing three parameters through a GET request:
– Advertisement for which the upgrade is being requested (ad id)
– 40-character hash (hash)
– Client platform (platform)
2. Tori server generates the links to the Securycast webcart server for
the different services (i.e., upgrades) available, including the following
parameters.
– Product type (pt1)
– Product name (pn1)
– Product price (pp1)
– VAT (pv1)
– Ad ID (pi1)
– Total price (tp)
– Price and currency (k)
– Product ID (pid)
– Payment Methods (f)
– Return URL (retUrl)
– 128-character checksum (c)
The server responses to the request and the browser displays the avail-
able services.
3. User selects the service and clicks to proceed to checkout. The browser
is redirected to the webcart server of the payment service provider,
Securycast, with the parameters defined in step 2.
4. Securycast responds with a form including all available payment meth-
ods defined by the merchant.
5. User confirms the Mobiilimaksu payment method. A script in the we-
bcart server generates a Cart ID for the organization (Tori). A GET
request is sent to the webcart server with the parameters:
– Product type (pt1)
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– Product name (pn1)
– Advertisement ID (pi1)
– Product price (pp1)
– VAT (pv1)
– Product ID (pid)
– Price and currency (k)
– Total price(tp)
– 128-character checksum (c)
– Return URL (retUrl)
– Payment Method selected (action)
– Indicator of purchase acceptance (accept)
– Email (email). Empty parameter.
– PIN code (pin). Empty parameter.
6. Client is redirected to the payment platform server for Tori and the
specific Cart ID with a GET request containing the parameters:
– Payment method selected (action)
– PIN code (pincode). Empty parameter.
– Application from which the request is redirected (application=WEBCART)
7. Client is redirected to the mobile billing gateway server of Securycast
with the parameters:
– Cart ID (id)
– 40-character hash (security)
8. Client is redirecting to the Elisa billing server with the parameters:
– Source Code(sc)
– Transaction ID (id)
9. Client is redirected back to the payment platform server with the details
of the transaction:
– Cart ID (id)
– Status of transaction (status)
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– Transaction ID (transaction id)
– Phone number (msisdn)
– Mobile Operator ID(operator)
– Price in cents (price)
– VAT(vat)
– Billing action (bcs action)
– 40-character hash (security)
10. Client is redirected back to the webcart server with the status of the
transaction and additional parameters for reference.
– Cart ID (cartid)
– Tori ID (organisationid)
– Status of transaction (status)
– Status code of transaction (statuscode)
11. From the webcart server, the client receives the confirmation message
for the transaction if the process has completed successfully, or other-
wise, an error message.
Additional parties and steps may be present at the time of the payment
processing; however, those remained invisible to the client band and reverse
engineering. It is not possible to describe, in detail, what communication
exists between the merchant, the payment service provider and the operator.
It can be assumed that at least the payment service provider and operator
exchange information to create and process valid transactions.
PayiQ Mobile Ticketing
PayiQ is a Finnish company offering mobile ticketing solutions. The mobile
application PayiQ Tickets, developed by PayiQ, is available to end users
to buy mobile tickets. To study the way PayiQ provides mobile ticketing
services and offers Mobiilimaksu as a payment method, the application was
tested on a Nexus 5 phone connected to the Elisa network.
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Process
To use the application, the user must register by providing personal infor-
mation including name, family name, phone number and e-mail. Once reg-
istered, the user accesses the application and creates a PIN code (4 digits),
which is thereafter used to authorise purchases. Subsequently, the user ac-
cesses the ticket shop. The types of tickets available to purchase depend on
the location. In Finland, the current available tickets are for public trans-
portation.
To buy a ticket, the user selects the city (Fig. 3.6), the ticket type
(Fig. 3.7) and the zone (Fig. 3.8).
Fig. 3.6: Cities. Fig. 3.7: Ticket type. Fig. 3.8: Zones available.
By clicking the “Buy” button, the user confirms the purchase and is
presented with a screen to select the payment method and to enter the PIN
code to authorise the payment (Fig. 3.9).
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Fig. 3.9: Authorising the payment. Fig. 3.10: Digital ticket.
If the PIN is correct, the order is processed. If the payment is successful,
the user receives the mobile ticket in the form of QR code (Fig. 3.10).
During the analysis, it was observed that the application works only when
the mobile device is connected to a MNO network. If a Wi-Fi connection is
active, a message prompts the user to connect to a mobile network.
Protocol
To understand the entire protocol carried out during the ticket purchase,
the traffic between the application and servers was recorded using a TLS
proxy. The Protocol described below is the result of the analysis of the
traffic captured. The diagram in Fig. 3.11 shows the parties involved and
the steps executed to complete the ticket purchase.
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Fig. 3.11: Steps of the payment process.
Parties Involved
Below is the list of parties observed during the acquisition and payment
of tickets in the PayiQ Tickets application.
• Client: The mobile application used to acquire a ticket for public
transportation.
• PayiQ: Merchant, providing mobile tickets through an HTTP API.
• Elisa: Mobile Network Operator, providing access to internet and Mo-
biilimaksu payment method.
Transaction Flow
The steps to acquire tickets from the application are listed below, starting
from the moment the consumer logs in the application to the moment he
receives the electronic ticket.
1. The user enters his credentials in the application, the application sends
a request consumerget to the PayiQ API server to retrieve information
about the user. The parameters sent in the request include:
– Shop ID (shop)
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– User name (login identity)
– User password (login password)
– Device details (identity plugindata)
– String of 40 random characters (random)
– Version (version)
– Request type (command)
– 128-character HMAC (hash)
2. If the credentials are correct, PayiQ API server returns the user in-
formation in addition to a one-time password (40-character OTP). In
the application, the user is asked to create a PIN code to authorise
payments.
3. The application sends a request to the PayiQ Consumer server to grant
access to the shop, passing along the OTP and additional parameters:
– Shop ID
– Email
– OTP
4. If the OTP is correct, the access request is successful and the PayiQ
Consumer server retrieves the list of available cities to purchase trans-
portation tickets.
5. The user selects the city, type and zone of the ticket desired and finally
clicks the “Buy” button in the application.
6. The application sends a consumertransaction request to the PayiQ API
server with the OTP received in the first request and the additional
parameters:
– Shop ID (shop)
– User name (login identity)
– OTP (login password)
– Location of the device (location)
– Device details (identity plugindata)
– String of 40 random characters (random)
– Version (version)
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– Request type (command)
– 128-character HMAC (hash)
7. The PayiQ API server returns the transaction history of the user and
a new OTP as part of the response.
8. The application sends a consumerpayment request to the PayiQ API
server with the latest OTP received and the parameters:
– Shop ID (shop)
– User name (login identity)
– OTP (login password)
– Location of the device (location)
– Device details (identity plugindata)
– Type of account (account type)
– String of 40 random characters (random)
– Reference number (reference)
– Account number (account number)
– Product details (id,count)
– Version (version)
– Request type (command)
– 128-character HMAC (hash)
9. The PayiQ API server returns the information to process the payment
and a new OTP:
– 128 Hex-character HMAC (hash)
– Transaction ID (id)
– OTP
– Action Pending (pending: operator verify)
– String of 40 random characters (random)
– Reference number (reference)
– Status of the transaction (status)
– Timestamp
– URL to the verification server (url/token)
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The token is a 40-character string, unique for each transaction to verify
the transaction.
10. The application redirects to the URL received in previous request (ver-
ification server).
11. The verification server redirects to Elisa server with the verification
code (token).
12. Elisa server returns the status of the transaction back to the verification
server.
13. The application sends a query request to the PayiQ API server with
the OTP received in the last request, the transaction ID and additional
parameters:
– Shop ID (shop)
– User name (login identity)
– OTP (login password)
– Device details (identity plugindata)
– Transaction ID (id)
– String of 40 random characters (random)
– Version (version)
– Request type (command)
– 128-character HMAC (hash)
In return, the API server sends the status of the transaction and a new
OTP.
14. If the transaction was accepted, the application sends a consumergetfile
request to the API server with the OTP received in the previous re-
quests, and the ID of the public transport provider for whom the ticket
is bought for. In return, a QR code is received to serve as the electronic
ticket, completing with this the procedure.
Like the Tori and Securycast case study, additional parties and steps may
participate in the payment transaction. Since those remained invisible to the
client, it is not possible for us to describe what communication exists between
the actual merchants (i.e., the public transport providers), PayiQ and the
operator. It is assumed that PayiQ and the operator exchange information
to create and processed valid transactions.
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Adversary Model
With the systems characterized, it is possible identify the threats and vul-
nerabilities. As Burns from the SANS Institute states in his paper [3], before
proceeding with the threat identification, it is convenient to analyse the sys-
tem as an adversary. Therefore, it is appropriate to define attack scenarios
in the context of computer security and to reason about the possible motives
behind malicious parties, i.e., adversaries, to act against mobile payment
systems.
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, an attack is “an attempt
to disrupt a computer system, network, etc., by gaining unauthorised access
or control” [29]. In the computer security field [18][10][1], additional factors
are considered to define and classify attacks such as the tools utilize for its
completion, the vulnerabilities exploited and the impact on the target. The
Adversaries, for their part, may be classified based on different criteria:
• Location: An adversary can be an insider or outsider, i.e., an entity
known and authorised to participate in the protocol or an unidentified
external entity with no explicit rights to take part in the process.
• Organization: The adversary may be a single entity or a group of
coordinated entities.
• Level of knowledge and resources: Depending on the level of
knowledge and the resources, in terms of funding and tools; the ad-
versary may be an expert with sophisticated and specialized resources
or a neophyte with access only to commercial or free tools.
• Activeness: The adversaries may vary in how actively they inter-
fere with the target system. An active advisory, concerns about read-
ing, modifying and injecting data. On the other hand, a passive advi-
sory only concerns about eavesdropping the communication channels to
gather information without causing alterations in the system, process
or data.
Regardless of the type of adversary, to plot an attack and to succeed, it is nec-
essary to identify the attack surface, i.e., all the elements in the system (e.g.,
individuals, organizations, hardware, software and communication channels),
establish the goals and targets, and to recognize potential weaknesses that
enable the attack.
In the systems studied in this thesis the main goals for any party to act
maliciously include:
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• Receive the service without being charged by the carrier.
• Receive a payment without providing any product or service.
• Excessive charging for the service provided.
• Obtain sensitive information.
The targets may be any of the participant entities listed for each system.
However, for this thesis, the MNO network was left out of scope as an at-
tacker.
Identifying the Threats
The next phase for the security analysis is to identify the threats by analysing
the flow of the data throughout the system and to locate entry and exit points
where critical security processes occur. Different approaches and models exist
to assist in the identification of threats [25]. The NIST Institute suggest the
use of the STRIDE 7 model. The model is designed to identify the types of
attacks an application is vulnerable to. This is accomplished by analysing
the properties opposite to the ones desired in a system.
The table 3.1 summarizes the list of threats identified after applying the
STRIDE model to the system comprised by Tori and Securycast. The same is
depicted in table 3.2 for the PayiQ ticketing application. The column Threat
Identifier shows the ID to identify the threat, the column Threat names
the threat identified while the column Property Violated lists which security
requirement is compromised by the threat. The column Path, describes the
possible path to find the threat and discover if the systems are vulnerable to
certain threat.
7STRIDE, an acronym derived from six threat categories: Spoofing identity,
Tampering with data, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, Elevation
of privilege
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Table 3.1: STRIDE model applied to the Tori-Securycast System
Threat
Identifier
Threat
Property
Violated
Path
TS.t01
Spoofing
the consumer.
Authentication
Impersonate someone
by using their mobile
network.
TS.t02
Spoofing the
client (browser
agent)
Authentication
Fake a mobile browser
agent.
Configure a SSL proxy.
TS.t03
Spoofing Tori
server.
Authentication Mock the Tori web page.
TS.t04
Spoofing the
payment
gateway.
Authentication
Impersonate the
gateway server.
TS.t05
Spoofing the
MNO billing
server.
Authentication
Impersonate the
billing server.
TS.t06
Spoofing the
transaction.
Authentication
Reutilize an authentic
transaction.
Trigger unauthorised
transactions.
TS.t07
Spoofing the
messages.
Authentication
Freshness
Reuse old messages.
TS.t08
Tampering the
Payment data
sent from Tori.
Integrity Modify the price set by Tori.
TS.t09
Tampering the
payment data.
Integrity
Modify the price or
account details in the
requests processed
by the Securycast server.
TS.t10
Tampering the
payment status.
Integrity
Modify the status
of a transaction.
TS.t11
Repudiate the
transactions.
Non repudiation
Request for services
without signing up.
TS.t12
Information
Disclosure.
Confidentiality
Intercept the communication
by setting a proxy.
TS.t13 Denial of Service. Availability
Flood the servers
with fake requests.
*Does not help achieve
any of the main goals.
TS.t14
Elevation of
Privilege.
Authorisation
Capture payments
from other customers
of Securycast.
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Table 3.2: STRIDE model applied to the PayiQ System
Threat
Identifier
Threat
Property
Violated
Path
PT.t01
Spoofing the
consumer.
Authentication
Take over a legitimate
user account.
PT.t02
Spoofing the client
(Application).
Authentication
Create a fictitious
application.
Configure a SSL proxy.
PT.t03
Spoofing the
merchant server.
Authentication
Impersonate
PayiQ servers.
PT.t04
Spoofing the MNO
billing server.
Authentication
Impersonate the
billing server.
PT.t05
Spoofing the
network.
Authentication
Spoof a mobile
network connection
in the application.
PT.t06
Spoofing the
messages.
Authentication
Reutilize authentic
messages or craft new
messages to simulate
authentic ones.
PT.t07
Tampering the
payment data.
Integrity
Modify the requests
to the servers.
PT.t08
Tampering the
payment status.
Integrity
Modify the status of
a transaction from
failed to successful.
PT.t09
Repudiate the
transactions.
Non-repudiation
Provide false personal
identifiable Information.
PT.t10
Information
Disclosure.
Confidentiality
Intercept the
communication
by setting a proxy.
PT.t11 Denial of Service. Availability
Block an account.
*Does not help
achieve the goals.
PT.t12
Elevation of
Privilege.
Authorisation
Obtain the NIP
to authorise payments.
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Testing the Threats
This section presents the test scenarios that were defined to accomplish one
of the goals defined in the adversary model while testing if the selected case
studies are vulnerable to the threats identified in the previous section.
Tori with Securycast
Man in the Middle
TS.a01 Goal: Obtain information about the payment process by eavesdrop-
ping the communication between the client and the Tori.
TS.a01 Related Threat ID: TS.t02, TS.t12.
TS.a01 Description: At the consumer end, configure a TLS proxy in the
web browser to intercept and decipher the communication between the
browser and the merchant server.
TS.a01 Results: Achieved. The attack was successful, the servers did not
refuse the connection, it was possible to decipher the messages sent
between the client, Tori and other parties involved. Nonetheless, the
attack requires explicit consent in the browser for to trust in the Man
in the Middle and is mainly useful for reverse engineering.
TS.a02 Goal: Act as the Securycast gateway to request payments to Elisa on
behalf Tori.
TS.a02 Related Threat ID: TS.t04, TS.t05.
TS.a02 Description: Redirect traffic intended to the gateway to a fake server
to divert payments. Create a fake transaction ID to send a payment
request to the carrier billing server.
TS.a02 Results: Failed. The transaction ID sent in the step 8 cannot be
spoofed. The carrier billing server sends an error if an invalid ID is
sent. Additionally, according to one of the Finnish MNO, the ser-
vice provider should indicate its domain prior to being able to request
charges [27]. Although, no evidence or documentation was found about
Elisa to confirm this.
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Fig. 3.12: Requesting a payment to the carrier billing server.
Impersonation
TS.a03 Goal: Acquire advertisement upgrades from Tori paid by someone else
by impersonating a Finnish mobile operator customer to access Mobi-
ilimaksu services, misusing their shared mobile Internet connection.
TS.a03 Related Threat ID: TS. t01.TS.t011.
TS.a03 Description: To impersonate a mobile subscriber, it is necessary to
find an individual holding a subscription with a Finnish mobile op-
erator. The individual should share his mobile connection. Then, in
the tethered device, purchase an upgrade in the Tori page using the
Mobiilimaksu payment method.
TS.a03 Result: Achieved. The mobile network operator identifies the payee
automatically 8 and charges accordingly. Furthermore, the user is never
prompted for a confirmation or authorization of the purchase after se-
lecting the mobile payment option. Therefore, as malicious user, is pos-
sible to take advantage of tethering services to acquire Tori upgrades
for free, as the owner of the subscription is the one billed.
8Elisa’s notes about Mobiilimaksu, elisa.fi/asiakaspalvelu/aihe/matkapuhelinliittymat
/ohje/mobiilimaksaminen
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Replay
TS.a04 Goal: Receive an upgrade from Tori without effecting the payment.
TS.a04 Related Threat ID: TS.t05, TS.t06, TS.t07, TS.t10.
TS.a04 Description: Bypass the payment by avoiding the redirection to the
mobile operator server, instead, redirecting the client to the Securycast
server with an old successful transactionID for the new cart.
Fig. 3.13: Skipping redirection to the MNO server.
TS.a04 Results: Failed. A general error thrown by the Securycast server.
Forgery
TS.a05 Goal: Execute payment transactions without the explicit consent of
the consumer.
TS.a05 Related Threat ID: TS.t06.
TS.a05 Description: The merchant adds JavaScript code in the advertisement
page to trick customers. Then, when the customer clicks on a strategic
place of the page, the merchant performs a cross site request forgery
attack sending a payment transaction request to the webcart server,
bypassing the webcart form to checkout and the confirmation from the
customer. Skipping every step before step 5 of the data flow as shown
in figure 3.14.
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Fig. 3.14: CSRF attack possible from the merchant to the webcart server.
TS.a05 Results: Achieved. The attack was successful. The webcart server
does not identify the request comes directly from the merchant page
and not the webcart form page. The payment is completed successfully.
TS.a06 Goal: Receive payments on behalf the merchant by forging Tori web-
page.
TS.a06 Related Threat ID: TS.t03.
TS.a06 Description: Cloning Tori webpage to appear to the consumers as the
real one, offering fake services while receiving mobile payments.
TS.a06 Results: Failed. Tori server is authenticated with a digital certifi-
cate; thus, it is not sufficient to clone the page to deceive consumers,
the forged page requires a valid certificate for consumers to trust in
it. Furthermore, to process mobile payments, it will be necessary to
impersonate Tori towards Securycast.
Tampering
TS.a07 Goal: Receive an upgrade from the Tori without effecting the payment
by tampering, as a consumer, the product details set by the merchant.
TS.a07 Related Threat ID: TS.t02, TS.t08.
TS.a07 Description: When the user selects the product, he is redirected to
the webcart server with the product details in the request. The attack
consists of modifying the request to the webcart server and setting a
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new value to the product price (pp1=0.00) to avoid paying the amount
established by Tori.
Fig. 3.15: Tampering payment details in the payment request.
TS.a07 Results: Failed. It was observed that the server responded with an
error code and redirects the browser back to the advertisement page.
It can be inferred that the webcart server checks the integrity of the
data using code c
TS.a08 Goal: Receive an upgrade from Tori without effecting the payment
by tampering the data in the webcart form received from the webcart
server of the payment service provider.
TS.a08 Related Threat ID: TS.t02, TS.t09.
TS.a08 Description: Tampering the data at different point of the transaction
flow, i.e., the form in the response from Securycast. Setting the value
of the product price (pp1) to 0.00 before confirming the payment.
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Fig. 3.16: Tampering the webcart form received from Securycast.
TS.a08 Results: Failed. The payment process continues after altering the
form in the response from Securycast. However, Elisa rejects the trans-
action, redirecting the user to the webcart server with an error message.
Fig. 3.17: Part of the protocol where the MNO rejects a payment for 0 e.
TS.a09 Goal: Receive an upgrade from Tori paying a minimum amount by
tampering the response from the webcart server at the consumer end,
i.e., the browser.
TS.a09 Related Threat ID: TS.t02,TS.t09.
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TS.a09 Description: As a consumer, tamper the data at different point of the
transaction flow, i.e., the form in the response from Securycast. Setting
the value of price pp1 to 0.10 before confirming the payment.
Fig. 3.18: Tampering the webcart form received from Securycast.
TS.a09 Results: Success. The payment process continues after altering the
form in the response from Securycast. The transaction is completed
and the consumer receives a receipt for the purchase.
Fig. 3.19: Part of the protocol where tampering attack is successful.
TS.a10 Goal: Receive an upgrade from Tori without effecting the payment by
tampering the requests from the browser, at the consumer end, to the
servers.
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TS.a10 Related Threat ID: TS.t02, TS.t09.
TS.a10 Description: Tampering the data at different point of the transaction
flow, i.e., after selecting the payment method and confirm. Tampering
the request to the Securycast payment server.
Fig. 3.20: Tampered data accepted by the webcart server.
Fig. 3.21: Tampering the request to the webcart server.
TS.a10 Results: Failed. The payment process continues after altering the re-
quest to Securycast. Consumer receives a receipt for the purchase, how-
ever, Tori does not provide the upgrade, even though user is charged.
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After detecting where in the protocol tampering the data results in a suc-
cessful attack (step 5), additional attacks were conducted to validate if the
same will happen with other payment methods.
TS.a11 Goal: Receive an upgrade from Tori paying a minimum amount with
credit card by tampering the requests from the server to the browser.
TS.a11 Related Threat ID: TS.t02, TS.t09.
TS.a11 Description: Tampering the form in the response from Securycast.
Setting the value of price pp1 to 0.10 and confirm the payment by
credit card.
TS.a11 Results: Success. The payment process continues after altering the
webcart form received from Securycast. The browser is redirected to
the card payment processing server with the new price, transaction is
completed and the customer receives a receipt for the purchase.
Fig. 3.22: 2e value product acquired for 0.10 cents.
HTML Injection
TS.a12 Goal: Receive an upgrade from Tori paying a minimum amount by
injecting HTML code.
TS.a12 Related Threat ID: TS.t09.
TS.a12 Description: With the breach in the protocol detected, utilize un-
sophisticated, unpaid tools to tamper the data, i.e., the web browser
development tools. Injecting HTML code to replace the information in
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the Webcart form and set the value of pp1 (price) to the one desired
(0.10).
Fig. 3.23: New value set to the product price.
TS.a12 Results: Achieved. Payment is requested with the price set and con-
firmation of product is received. Since the Mobiilimaksu payment is
processed without further authorisation required, the payment method
was change to credit card to make it evident the new price was accepted
and the payment transaction was processed.
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Fig. 3.24: New price to pay by card.
Others with Securycast
After identifying a possible design weakness in the way Securycast processes
transactions, it was important to test if this was a particular case of the
payment processing for the merchant Tori, or if it was a general weakness in
the payment services offered by Securycast. Therefore, different merchants
using Securycast services were required. Securycast, in its web page, pub-
lishes a list of partners who are, by now, potentially vulnerable. To avoid
harm, a charity organization, Nena Paiva, was selected from the list9. Then,
the traffic was analysed during the donation transaction to define the attack
scenario below described.
S.a01 Goal: Validate if tampering the payment data is successful in a differ-
ent customer of Securycast.
S.a01 Related Threat ID: TS.t06.
S.a01 Description: Nena Paiva allows a minimum donation of 10 Euro. The
attack consists of tampering the message to Securycast and donate only
1e.
9Securycast Partners www.securycast.com/en/References
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Fig. 3.25: Tampering donation details in the request to Securycast.
S.a01 Results: Achieved. It was possible to change the amount of donation
to 1 Euro. Securycast does not validate the integrity of the messages
from the browser. It was also noticed that, in the donation page, there
is no verification code sent from the donation server to Securycast.
Fig. 3.26: Donation of 1e successful.
S.a02 Goal: Capture payments from different customers of Securycast.
S.a02 Related Threat ID: TS.t14.
S.a02 Description: Utilize a valid organizationID provided by Securycast
to deviate transactions by modifying the value in the requests to Se-
curycast.
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S.a02 Results: Failed. The cart ID created by Securycast is linked to the or-
ganization ID, thus, the transaction pertained to certain cart ID cannot
be processed for a different organization that the one that originated
it.
PayiQ Mobile Ticketing
After using the PayiQ Tickets application and analysing the messages ex-
changed during a ticket purchase, it was possible to define the attack scenar-
ios to achieve the goals listed in the adversary model. We tested the security
mechanisms implemented by PayiQ to protect the payment transactions as
follows.
Man in the Middle
PT.a01 Goal: Obtain information about the payment process by eavesdrop-
ping the communication between the client and the PayiQ servers.
PT.a01 Related Threat ID: PT.t02, PT.t03, PT.t04.
PT.a01 Description: The communication between the application and the
servers occurs over TLS. The servers utilize digital certificates to au-
thenticate themselves, the weak point to achieve the goal resides in the
client. The attack consists of installing a TLS proxy in the phone where
the PayiQ Tickets resides to decipher the messages.
PT.a01 Results: Achieved. The attack was successful, the PayiQ servers did
not refuse the connection, however, it requires root permissions, there-
fore, does not occur unwittingly to the consumer. For this thesis, the
attack was useful for reverse engineering.
Impersonation
PT.a02 Goal: Purchase tickets via the application without effecting the pay-
ment by impersonating a legitimate user holding a mobile subscription.
PT.a02 Related Threat ID: PT.t1.
PT.a02 Description: To impersonate a user, it is necessary to obtain their
credentials. This can be done applying social engineering. Then, with
the username and password of a legitimate user, access the application
(in a different phone) to buy a ticket.
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PT.a02 Results: Failed. The payment failed. A message was received indicat-
ing the phone number of the logged user was different from the billing
phone number, i.e., the one detected in the connection (Fig. 3.27).
Fig. 3.27: Operator Error
Replay
PT.a03 Goal: Reproduce the behaviour of the PayiQ Tickets application on a
personal computer to obtain a one-time password to access the store.
PT.a03 Related Threat ID: PT.t01, PT.t06, PT.t10.
PT.a03 Description: From the protocol illustrated before (Fig. 3.11), it
is inferred that each request to the PayiQ API server requires a one-
time password (OTP) except from the first request which is the point
where a replay attack could succeed. The attack consists of sending
the previously recorded message for a consumerget request to the API
server.
PT.a03 Results: Achieved. The request was successful, the API server re-
turns the information about the user and a new OTP (Fig. 3.28). It
was observed that the same replayed message can be used to obtain
any number of OTPs. No freshness is required for the request to be
processed successfully.
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Fig. 3.28: Replay attack response.
Forgery
PT.a04 Goal: Acquire tickets forcing someone else to pay by forging a mobile
connection and misusing a shared mobile Internet connection.
PT.a04 Related Threat ID: TS.t05.
PT.a04 Description: Connect to the mobile network of a Finnish MNO sub-
scription holder via Wi-Fi. Then, in the tethered device, purchase tick-
ets through the application using the Mobiilimaksu payment method.
PT.a04 Results: Failed. The application requires a mobile connection to func-
tion properly. Utilizing the application while being connected to a
Wi-Fi network produces an error message.
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Fig. 3.29: Application verifies the connection type.
PT.a05 Goal: With the OTP received in the attack PT.a03, continue the at-
tempt to purchase tickets by reproducing the application behaviour
on a PC tethered to a device with mobile Internet connection. This
will avoid the network verification of the application while still tak-
ing advantage of the Mobiilimaksu payment method in shared mobile
networks.
PT.a05 Related Threat ID: PT.t02.
PT.a05 Description: It was observed that without an OTP or using an old
one in the step 3 of the protocol, the Store server would return an error
message. Thus, the attack consists of mimicking the application by
forging the application agent in a desktop browser. Then, make the
GET request in step 3 of the protocol with the OTP received in the
attack PT.a03.
PT.a05 Results: Failed. The request was successful and the access to the
store was granted. In the store, it was possible to select the ticket.
Nonetheless, the process failed when clicking the ”buy” button. Instead
of receiving the form to enter the PIN and authorise the purchase an
error message was displayed (Fig. 3.30), terminating the purchase
process there because we were unable to emulate the interactive step
of the application in the PC.
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Fig. 3.30: Browsing the store via desktop browser.
Tampering
PT.a06 Goal: Skip the requests to the Store server for product selection and
the PIN entry, which we were unable to emulate on the PC. Now at-
tempting to acquire tickets by sending the request with the product
details directly to the API server, utilizing an OTP received from the
replay attack.
PT.a06 Related Threat ID: PT.t07.
PT.a06 Description: A different approach to find weaknesses in the PayiQ
protocol is to tamper a request to the API server providing a new OTP
to bypass the authentication process. The attack consists of crafting a
CHAPTER 3. SECURITY ANALYSIS 62
new consumerpayment request (step 8 of the protocol) utilizing a new
OTP to try to proceed with the ticket order.
PT.a06 Results: Failed. No error is received about the login data, OTP is
valid. Nonetheless, a different error is produced as seen in figure 3.31.
Fig. 3.31: Error in the message integrity validation.
Privilege Elevation
PT.a07 Goal: Acquire tickets with stolen or borrowed phone or SIM card of a
mobile subscriber.
PT.a07 Related Threat ID: PT.t01, PT.t12.
PT.a07 Description: With the phone and the credentials of a legitimate user
(previously gathered applying social engineering), access the applica-
tion and purchase tickets.
PT.a07 Results: Achieved. Authorising a purchase requires a PIN, only
known by the user. However, a new PIN is created every time the
user logs in. Therefore, by logging out and logging in again, the at-
tacker can generate a new PIN to authorise purchases. Additionally,
registering a new account with a phone number previously registered
was successful. Thus, to pay for tickets, it is possible to create a new
account using the phone number of a legitimate user, as long as, the
attacker has access to the SIM card of the legitimate user.
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Reverse Engineering
PT.a08 Goal: Gather additional information about the application to repro-
duce its behaviour on a PC to finally succeed at acquiring tickets with-
out any use of the PayiQ Tickets application by entirely emulating
the requests from the application. Using a legitimate username and
password to PayiQ but misusing a shared mobile Internet connection.
PT.a08 Related Threat ID: PT.t01, PT.t06.
PT.a08 Description: From the transaction flow it was observed that each
message exchanged between the API server and the application has a
hash. The hash value seems to be utilized as a HMAC to validate the
integrity of each message. Thus, the attack consists of performing re-
verse engineering to the installation file of the application to discover
the function used to create the HMAC. Subsequently, craft new mes-
sages with valid hash values for the server to process them as authentic.
The attack requires the following phases:
1. The first phase consists of finding the function to create the HMAC
and determine the required input to generate a valid integrity code
for each type of message in the transaction flow.
2. The second phase consists of identifying valid values for each pa-
rameter in the request message (e.g., device details, reference num-
ber, account number, product id).
3. Next step is to craft the messages and send them to the servers
to get the values necessary to proceed with the transaction (i.e.,
OTP, transaction ID, token).
4. Identify the manner to bypass the authorization and pass the ver-
ification towards the MNO billing server for the transaction to be
accepted.
5. If the transaction is accepted, the last step is to open the appli-
cation and find if the ticket can be retrieved for proper display.
PT.a08 Results: Achieved. The function to produce the HMAC and the key,
were found and replicated to produce valid HMACs for new messages.
New POST requests to the API Server were crafted and successfully
processed by the API server. A transaction ID was created to acquire
a ticket. The API server sent the token to charge the MNO. With
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the token, it was possible to reach the verification server 10, avoiding
the PIN entry. It was noticed that the connection to the verification
server must be through a mobile network for the transaction to be
accepted. With the tested operator, no matching phone numbers be-
tween the used SIM and the one entered during the account registration
are required to complete the payment. After validating the successful
transaction with a query request, the application was opened and the
ticket bought, completely outside the real application, was retrieved .
Fig. 3.32: Spoofing the application to bypass its security mechanisms.
Mitigation
This section concludes the security analysis with the controls that could be
implemented by the systems under study to mitigate the threats for which
an attack was successful.
10The attack succeeds if the Internet connection is provided by Elisa. It is important
to notice that the verification server will return a mismatch phone number error if the
request is done through the Telia (Sonera) network.
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Tori with Securycast
The system comprised by Tori and Securycast was the most vulnerable one.
The table 3.3, below, presents the summary of the attacks performed along
with the indicator of whether the threats related to certain attack were mit-
igated or not by the developers.
Table 3.3: Summary of the attacks and mitigation status.
Attack
Identifier
Attack Type Threat Related Mitigated
TS.a01 Man in the Middle TS.t02, TS.t12 NO
TS.a02 Man in the Middle TS.t04, TS.t05 YES
TS.a03 Impersonation TS.t01 NO
TS.a04 Replay TS.t05, TS.t06, TS.t07 YES
TS.a05 Cross Site Request Forgery TS.t06 NO
TS.a06 Forgery TS.t03 YES
TS.a07 Tampering TS.t02, TS.t08 YES
TS.a08 Tampering TS.t02, TS.t09 YES
TS.a09 Tampering TS.t02, TS.t09 NO
TS.a10 Tampering TS.t02, TS.t09 NO
TS.a11 Tampering TS.t02, TS.t09 NO
TS.a12 HTML Injection TS.t09 NO
S.a01 Others TS.t09 NO
S.a02 Others TS.t14 YES
A mitigation is proposed below for those cases where no countermeasures
were found to prevent an attack from occurring.
TS.m01 Problem: It is possible to impersonate the client to the server and
vice versa.
TS.m01 Related Attack: TS.a01.
TS.m01 Related Threat ID: TS.t02, TS.t12.
TS.m01 Countermeasure: The problem is mitigated with the use of TLS
connections. However, the authenticity of the client is not verified by
the servers, which leaves the possibility to eavesdrop the traffic at the
client end. The attack described in previous section was accomplished
because explicit trust was given to a forged certificate for the proxy
acting as the Man in the Middle, the consumer is aware, at all times,
about the presence of the intermediary.
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TS.m02 Problem: Mobiilimaksu payment method is accepted if a mobile con-
nection is detected, no authorization is required.
TS.m02 Related Attack ID: TS.a03.
TS.m02 Related Threat ID: TS.t01.
TS.m02 Countermeasure: Provide means for a mobile subscriber to confirm
and authorise each payment transaction. This can be accomplished by
assigning a randomly generated authorization code to the subscribers.
TS.m03 Problem: The merchant can bypass the consumer confirmation to the
payment gateway, triggering unauthorised payments.
TS.m03 Related Attack ID: TS.a05.
TS.m03 Related Threat ID: TS.t06.
TS.m03 Countermeasure: The payment service provider, Securycast, should
enforce the correct flow of the transaction from the moment the mer-
chant triggers the request to the webcart server. This could be done
using session tokens, provided by the server. The webcart server gen-
erates a session token and sends it along with the webcart form, the
next request sent, confirming the payment, should include the token
previously generated by the server.
TS.m04 Problem: Information about payment and product details is easily
identifiable.
TS.m04 Related Attack ID: TS.a09, TS.a10, TS.a11, TS.a12.
TS.m04 Related Threat ID: TS.t02, TS.t09.
TS.m04 Countermeasure: Replace critical data with a representation of the
same, preventing its identification, hence, modifiability. This can be
accomplished by applying tokenization to the payment details.
TS.m05 Problem: It is possible to make unauthorised changes to the payment
details without being detected by the payment service provider.
TS.m05 Related Attack ID: TS.a09, TS.a10, TS.a11, TS.a12.
TS.m05 Related Threat ID: TS.t02, TS.t09.
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TS.m05 Countermeasure: Provide means to verify the integrity of each mes-
sage transmitting critical data for the transaction process. To achieve
this, a checksum/HMAC code must be generated along with the mes-
sages to be transmitted in the sending point and verified at the receiving
point.
PayiQ Mobile Ticketing
The application developed by PayiQ resulted resilient to most of the threats.
The table 3.4, below, presents the summary of the attacks performed along
with the indicator of whether the threats related to certain attack were mit-
igated or not by the developers.
Table 3.4: Summary of the attacks and mitigation status.
Attack
Identifier
Attack Type Threat Related Mitigated
PT.a01 Man in the Middle PT.t02 NO
PT.a02 Impersonation PT.t01 YES
PT.a03 Replay PT.t01, PT.t06, PT.t10 NO
PT.a04 Forgery PT.t05 YES
PT.a05 Forgery PT.t02 YES
PT.a06 Tampering PT.t07 YES
PT.a07 Privilege Elevation PT.t01, PT.t12 NO
PT.a08 Reverse Engineering PT.t01, PT.t06 NO
Similarly, to the Tory with Securycast case study, a mitigation is proposed
below for those cases where no countermeasures were found to prevent an
attack from occurring in the PayiQ Tickets application.
PT.m01 Problem: It is possible to impersonate the client to the server and
vice versa.
PT.m01 Related Attack: PT.a01.
PT.m01 Related Threat ID: PT.t02.
PT.m01 Countermeasure: The problem is mitigated with the use of TLS con-
nections. However, the authenticity of the client is not verified by the
server which leaves open the possibility to eavesdrop the traffic at the
client end. The attack described in previous section was accomplished
because explicit trust was given to a forged certificate for the appli-
cation acting as the Man in the Middle, the consumer is aware, at all
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times, about the presence of the intermediary. As far as what PayiQ
concerns, they could validate the integrity of the downloaded appli-
cation and platform by making use of trusted computing technology
for remote attestation 11 of each client loading its application. How-
ever, attesting each client with this method may not be very realistic
solution.
PT.m02 Problem: It is possible to receive one-time passwords (OTP) from the
servers by re-utilizing an authentic message.
PT.m02 Related Attack: PT.a03.
PT.m02 Related Threat ID: PT.t01, PT.06,PT.10.
PT.m02 Countermeasure: Provide freshness to each message exchanged dur-
ing the transaction process to ensure new requests are served, exclu-
sively. This is accomplished by adding a timestamp or nonce to each
message.
PT.m03 Problem: It is possible to change the authorization PIN by creating
a new session with the PayiQ servers.
PT.m03 Related Attack: PT.a07.
PT.m03 Related Threat ID: PT.t01, PT.t12.
PT.m03 Countermeasure: Generate a random PIN that will last more than
a session to prevent it being easily guessable and changeable.
PT.m04 Problem: It is possible to bypass the authorization and authentica-
tion performed by the application and acquire tickets using the mobile
connection of an Elisa subscriber.
PT.m04 Related Attack: PT.a08.
PT.m04 Related Threat ID: PT.t01, PT.t06.
PT.m04 Countermeasure: Provide means for a mobile subscriber to confirm
and authorise each payment transaction directly to the MNO billing
server, rather that leaving the authentication and authorisation tasks to
the merchants and payments processors. This can be accomplished by
11Remote attestation: Method where a verifying system (server) determines if a remote
system (client) is trustworthy by analysing evidence of its state, e.g., a hash of the software
that has been loaded on the client [17].
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assigning a randomly generated authorization code to the subscribers.
Additionally, the verification server should always verify the phone
number of the account in the request, matches the phone number to
bill for the transaction, preventing the misuse of shared mobile net-
works. Registering each instance of the application, binding it to the
phone number of the subscriber and creating a unique shared secret for
each instance with the API server would make the task of spoofing the
requests to the API more difficult for attackers.
Chapter 4
Evaluation
This chapter presents an evaluation of the systems studied regarding their
success or failure to meet the security requirements of payment solutions.
Identification
Tori with Securycast Although it is unnecessary to register to Tori to
enjoy its services, it has an option to sign up as a user. To identify a user, Tori
requires a valid email address, also used to activate the account. Securycast,
for its part, serves from a gateway in charge of detecting the IP Address of
the incoming connection, the operator, and the phone number (MSISDN)
to identify consumers/subscribers. The gateway succeeds at identifying the
subscriber to request the charge to the MNO as seen in the figure below.
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Fig. 4.1: Payment gateway response in
the Elisa network
Fig. 4.2: Payment gateway response in
the DNA network
PayiQ Mobile Ticketing By creating a user account in the PayiQ appli-
cation, the consumer is identified with an email that serves as the user ID,
and a phone number. Both remained linked from the registration onwards.
The data cannot be modified by the owner of the account but only by PayiQ
administrators.
Authentication
Tori with Securycast If registered to Tori, users must provide a password
of a minimum of 5 characters long, no level of complexity is required (e.g., a
mix of alphanumeric characters, upper and lower cases, inclusion of special
characters), therefore, it is not considered as a strong authenticator [11].
PayiQ Mobile Ticketing PayiQ uses a single factor to authenticate its
users to the application. The authenticator is a password which comprises
only 6 characters without any level of complexity. Such password represents
a weak point in the system. Advantageously, authentication occurs for each
request coming from the application to the PayiQ servers with a HMAC.
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Authorisation
Tori with Securycast A single click is required to confirm and execute
the payment in the webcart form. No mechanism was found to bind the con-
firmation from the consumer or to authorise the payment. Tethering poses
a security risk to subscribers. Since subscribers have no means to prevent
unwanted purchases, transactions may occur unwittingly to them until re-
ceiving the mobile bill. Furthermore, Tori is capable of forging payment
confirmations to the webcart server.
PayiQ Mobile Ticketing PayiQ implements authorization controls to en-
sure the appropriate user confirms the purchases. In the application, the PIN
code set by the user is entered to authorise the payment, after the selection
of the payment method. The PIN is verified by the application and never
leaves the mobile device. However, it is set by the user, opening the possi-
bility of being guessable and changeable as it lasts only for the session the
user is logged to the application. If the user logs out or logs into a different
device, the session is lost and, when the user access again, a new PIN must
be set.
Integrity
Tori with Securycast Both parties, Tori and Securycast, attempt to pro-
vide integrity to their data by adding a checksum such as HMAC to the
requests coming from the client agent. However, they fail at merging their
solutions for integrity. Tori protects the payment data and product details
sent to the webcart server, in the step 3 of the protocol (Fig. 3.5), by passing
the parameter c, a 128 Hex-character checksum. The webcart server veri-
fies the integrity of the data before sending the form for checkout in step
4. The server sends, in response, the form containing the data provided by
Tori. However, before creating the cart ID in step 5 and proceeding with the
payment, Securycast does not validate for a second time the integrity of the
data, allowing the process to continue with tampered data. In further steps
of the protocol, the presence of a 40 Hex-character HMAC is observed under
the name “security”, protecting the data exchanged between Securycast and
the MNO Elisa.
PayiQ Mobile Ticketing PayiQ succeeds at providing integrity to the
data exchange between the application and its servers by adding a 128 Hex-
character HMAC to each message in a POST request to the API server.
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Confidentiality
Tori with Securycast Regarding the confidentiality of data, a greater
part of the protocol in the Tori-Securycast transactions occurs over TLS
which ensures data is traversing the internet through secured, ciphered, chan-
nels within authenticated parties. The one server leaking data is the gateway
server, exposing the mobile number of the subscriber.
PayiQ Mobile Ticketing Concerning the confidentiality of data, the com-
munication between the application and the servers occurs through a se-
cured channel implementing TLS. Additional confidentiality is provided with
the use of Tokens to communicate information about the transaction to the
MNO.
Audit mechanisms and non-repudiation
Tori with Securycast As far the investigation concerned, Tori page does
not provide ample audit support to users, starting from the fact that the
entire universe of its users is not registered and continuing to the observa-
tion that the activity of registered users does not remain for more than 3
months. It is unknown if there are logs between Securycast and Tori about
the payment transactions and the information they may include.
PayiQ Mobile Ticketing Compared to Tori, PayiQ is in a better position
to provide audit support and guarantee non-repudiation because its users
pass through a registration process providing the means to identify them
and link their actions to them through a unique identifier. Additionally, the
application keeps logs of all the transactions, both successful and failed ones.
Chapter 5
Discussion
In an ideal world, the mobile payment solutions presented in this thesis would
have appropriate mechanisms to fulfil the security requirements listed in the
chapter 2. However, providing security is a task that requires exhaustive
analysis and more effort than just utilizing cryptographic mechanisms such
as hash functions and ciphered channels. This chapter presents a discussion
of the outcome of the security analysis.
At a glance, the entire payment process implemented by Tori and Se-
curycast seemed rather simple: User accepts to pay for an upgrade with a
single click, subsequently, the mobile operator charges the user. Nonetheless,
the observed security in the Tori web page was questionable, especially by
noticing the following:
• Using Tori services to publish an advertisement does not require any
type of registration, which makes it difficult to track the actions of a
particular user.
• Neither Tori nor Securycast verify the client agent (i.e., Tori mobile
application, mobile or web browser) used to access its services to deter-
mine whether the Mobiilimaksu payment method should be available
or not.
After completing the security analysis, it was clear that the lack of authenti-
cation controls or the implementation of weak ones does not expose sensitive
data about the customer or subscriber when executing a payment transac-
tion. However, neglecting the main security services required by mobile pay-
ments make Tori an ideal platform for scams. Whether an unregistered user
publishes a counterfeit advertisement to attract honest buyers, leaving little
trace for prosecution, or a malicious user accesses the account of honest sell-
ers to mislead their buyers, Tori seems to be risky platform for trading, even
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though, its purpose is only to connect sellers and buyers. Most importantly,
the way Securycast serves the webcart form and processes payments poses
a security breach, allowing Tori, if it became malicious, to triggered pay-
ment request without the approval and confirmation of the customer. This
raises a concern about payment service providers trusting the merchants to
participate in the execution of payment transactions.
While we have no reasons to suspect any criminal activity by Tori or
other known merchants, the trust model is not as robust as it could be.
The observations mentioned above, represent an opportunity for Tori and
Securycast to improve their services. Providing appropriate identification,
authentication and strengthening the correct transaction flow would increase
the level of security to protect customers and their payment transactions.
On the other hand, a significantly different protocol was found using the
PayiQ Tickets application, not only because PayiQ carries out the entire pay-
ment process acting as both the merchant and the payment service provider
but also because the mobile application enables more security mechanisms
than web applications.
To access PayiQ services, a registration must be completed, additionally,
the users must provide a PIN code to authorise the payment. These are two
additional steps in the process of acquiring digital products, in comparison
to single-click solutions. Nonetheless, we still found areas of opportunity in
the way PayiQ offers electronic tickets:
• From the installation file of the application, it was possible to find the
key and function that generates the HMAC for each message to the
API server. It is possible that additional obfuscation is required in
the code of the application to make it less intelligible, reducing the
probability of spoofed requests to the API. It is also advisable that a
unique key (shared secret) is created for each instance of the application
to authenticate requests to the API server.
• The transaction flow is enforced with the use of one-time passwords
generated by the API server. However, the field used for this parameter
in the same as the one for the login password of the user. Having two
different valid values for the same parameter make it vulnerable to
spoofing, breaking the correct flow of the transaction.
Additionally, fraud is an important aspect to prevent in financial transac-
tions. However, the user accounts used in Tori and PayiQ Tickets to per-
form the different tests, were never blocked or disabled by any of the service
providers, even though unusual transactions were executed with them. Fur-
thermore, it was observed that payment service providers processed the same
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transaction more than once, which makes them prone to fraudulent payment
transactions. Regarding the participation of the mobile operator Elisa, the
mechanism they used to protect direct carrier billing payments remain un-
known, as no technical information is publicly available. The only controls
observed by the MNO is a limit of 150 e per month per mobile subscription
destined to the direct carrier billing payment Mobiilimaksu and the option
to disabled this payment method in the account settings of the subscribers.
Overall, the direct carrier billing method seemed to be strictly focused on
identifying the mobile subscription to accept payments. However, additional
mechanism should be in place to verify the authenticity of the payment re-
quest from the consumer including the intended payee and amount. It is
still questionable who should be the owner of that task, the payment ser-
vice provider or the mobile operator. If the type to payments allowed for
direct carrier billing were to change from micro payments to larger amounts
of money, it may be worth for either one of the payment service provider
or the mobile operator to invest in providing better mechanisms to validate
the authenticity of payment requests and provide means for the consumer
or subscriber to authorise payments, sacrificing the simplicity of single-click
transactions for better security.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
The security analysis of two case studies of direct carrier billing show that de-
spite the development of security mechanisms to protect electronic payment
transactions, service providers face difficulties to offer a secure solution. None
of the payment solutions studied offer services completely immune to security
threats. The major vulnerabilities found were:
1. If the merchant takes part in the payment transaction, it can forge the
payment confirmation from the user to appear legitimate to the carrier
billing server.
2. Wi-Fi tethering can be misused to complete payments on behalf of the
mobile subscriber account.
3. It is possible to bypass the security of a mobile application.
PayiQ was found to provide better security to its users and merchants who
are not required to develop mobile or web applications to offer their products
to consumers, unlike Securycast. However, this comes at the cost of less
flexibility as there is no separate merchant in the system and it is still possible
to misuse it services.
Securycast, for its part, offers a solution similar to Stride and PayPal,
which is a webcart (checkout) page that handles electronic payments. How-
ever, it lacks the use of tokenization to send data to the payment gateway (as
Stripe does) or to tokenize transaction details set by the merchant (as PayPal
does). This, in addition to the integrity validation that should perform when
sending or receiving sensitive transaction data.
The transactions that both studied payment service providers handle re-
main in the category of micro payments, which reduces considerably the
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financial risks in each transaction. However, in a system accessible by thou-
sands of users, malicious users may leverage the ability to tamper the process
without being detected, increasing the damage considerably.
Overall, Tori, Securycast and PayiQ seem to have an idea about the
appropriate mechanisms to secure mobile payments. However, overlooked
sensitive entry and exit points in the flow of the transaction may jeopardise
the entire security chain implemented to protect the payment transactions.
From the security analysis, it is concluded that:
1. In the basis of carrier billing, tethering is like sharing the wallet. Mobile
subscribers sharing their connection are vulnerable to receiving charges
for unwanted payments executed through their connection.
2. Payment service providers should not trust the merchants. Malicious
merchants are in position to request for payment transactions by trick-
ing honest consumers.
3. The conjunction of registered users and mobile applications can offer
more security than unregistered users and web applications for pay-
ments, at the cost of less flexibility in the business model.
4. In-app security controls are not sufficient for payment transactions.
Controls should be implemented in the servers as well.
5. The simplicity of single-click transactions pose risks for consumers.
For now, it is recommended for consumers or subscribers to disable direct
carrier billing payment method from their mobile subscription or to pay
special attention to whom they share their mobile connection as well as their
browsing activity to avoid malicious merchant sites.
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